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Abstract
We propose a rule-based anomaly detection system for railway signalling that
mitigates attacks by a Dolev-Yao attacker who is able to inject control com-
mands and to perform semantic attacks. The system as well mitigates the effects
of a compromised signal box that an attacker uses to issue licit but mistimed
control messages. We consider an attacker that could cause train derailments
and collisions, if our countermeasure is not employed. We apply safety principles
of railway operation to a distributed anomaly detection system that inspects in-
coming commands on the signals and points. The proposed anomaly detection
system detects all attacks of our model without producing false positives, while
it requires only a small amount of overhead in terms of network communication
and latency compared to normal train operation.
Keywords: critical infrastructure protection, cyber-physical system,
cybersecurity railway signalling, rule-based anomaly detection, safety and
security co-engineering, semantic attack
1. Introduction
Railway signalling systems, like many other industrial control systems (ICSs),
increasingly leverage commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) hardware, public net-
works and open protocols in order to exploit the benefits of standardized prod-
ucts. At the same time, this transformation exposes railway signalling to a
range of new security threats [1–5] because standard products lower the thresh-
old for attacks by vulnerabilities becoming public more likely and being easier
to exploit. Physical protection of railway signalling infrastructure is virtually
impossible due to its spatial extension along the railway tracks. This provides
a large attack surface for the attacker with little chance of being caught and
sufficient time to perform attacks on signalling devices and networks.
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Securing safety-critical signalling infrastructure is a difficult task because se-
curity measures must not interfere negatively with the safety functionality in
order that railway transportation remains safe and keeps the safety certification.
Interference could, for example, result from a security application introducing
delay in the safety’s communication, such that safety is unable to meet response
time requirements and subsequently violates the system’s fail-safe property. An-
other cause of friction between railway safety and security is the difference in
the duration of the system lifecycle. In safety, a system is subject to a long
lasting certification process and is assumed safe forever after completing it. In
security on the contrary, vulnerabilities and attacks become public permanently
such that systems are required to be updated and patched frequently. This is
incompatible with today’s safety certification because the system cannot be left
vulnerable for the time a safety re-certification lasts.
A solution to bring safety and security together is to wrap the safety function-
ality into a protective layer of security [1] without the need to modify safety
systems, safety applications, or safety protocols. The discussed difficulty to in-
tegrate security in safety, the large number of devices, its spatial extension, and
the lack of physical protection constitute the complexity of the critical infras-
tructure (CI) railway signalling. This also increases the chance that employed
security measures fail or are compromised by an attacker. A single countermea-
sure cannot cover the full complexity of the attack surface and the increasing
number of attacks on CIs. A defence in depth concept with multiple different
defence strategies mitigates the effect and makes railway signalling more re-
silient to attacks. In this way, a security measure can be ineffective, failing, or
compromised while the overall system remains protected.
We investigate anomaly detection on the controllers of railway signalling as
one building block among many of a defence in depth concept. Other security
measures should cover communication integrity and authentication, hardware
integrity against physical tampering with devices, a separation kernel to isolate
different pieces of software, and health monitoring during runtime as discussed
by Heinrich et al. [6].
We study sophisticated semantic attacks that make use of licit control commands
to set railway signals and points to a state that may cause train accidents.
Firewalls and input validation on the receiver cannot mitigate an effect of these
commands that – on their own – are licit but arrive mistimed at the controller.
Authenticating command and control network communication does not suffice
in railway signalling because authentication is difficult to introduce in safety
protocols, could be compromised by the attacker or might be ineffective if the
attacker controls the signal box that is authorized to dispatch commands.
We show that it is possible to enhance the IT security resilience of railway
signalling networks against application layer attacks misusing licit control com-
mands by a rule-based anomaly detection system. Safe train operation is ensured
by the signal box of a railway station that controls all mutable infrastructure
elements and prohibits any hazardous configuration and unsafe train movement.
However, the safety system does neither ensure the integrity of the signal box
nor the authentic transmission and execution of the signal box’s commands to
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the field elements. Therefore, licit commands can be manipulated, delayed,
dropped, resent, reordered, or injected.
To mitigate this threat, we use the safety logic encoded in the signal box as
template for a distributed, rule-based anomaly detection system. The system
validates critical commands on the individual receiving field element against
the state of relevant, adjacent field elements that are neighbours in the physical
track topology. Furthermore, we describe attack patterns of a strong attacker on
the railway system who possesses expert knowledge of railway signalling and has
moderate resources available to perform attacks. Moreover, we discuss the im-
portant aspect of safety and security co-engineering: how to deal with detected
security incidents while maintaining the fail-safety and freedom of interference
of the system. Security measures should be closely tied to safety functionality
to maintain operation of the safety system in the presence of disruptions [7]. Fi-
nally, we implement our anomaly detection system and evaluate it on a dataset
of authentic railway command and control traffic.
2. Related Work
We are the first to explore the field of anomaly detection in railway signalling as
there are only few publications examining cybersecurity in railway at all. There
are several publications on other cyber-physical systems (CPSs) and ICSs with
comparable properties that are relevant to our investigation of defending against
semantic attacks.
Schlehuber et al. [1, 2] have described the challenges of protecting safety-critical
railway signalling from cyberattacks. Railway signalling systems are designed
and certified for multiple decades of lifetime assuming they do not experience
significant modification. Frequent updates of security measures (e.g., vulner-
ability patches, malware signatures) would violate the certification if not de-
signed properly. To avoid re-certification in case of a change in the security
measures, Schlehuber et al. propose a “shell concept” comprising a protective
security shell around the safety functionality. With the shell concept, security
and safety functionality is separated such that security can be updated inde-
pendently from safety, and security does not interfere negatively with the safety
functionality. Heinrich et al. [6] propose a hardware platform according to the
shell concept that allows the execution of safety and security functionality on
the same hardware without interference by the help of a separation kernel. The
rule-based anomaly detection proposed in this article can be one of the security
measures deployed on this platform that interacts with the safety functionality
which controls the railway signalling field elements.
Valdivia et al. [5] highlight that safety in railways is well studied and has pro-
duced several standards for safety-critical systems. However, similar to Schle-
huber et al., they identify that railway cybersecurity has not experienced suf-
ficient attention yet. Similar to safety, standards are required to harmonize
railway cybersecurity protection. They as well describe that, due to its dura-
tion, re-certification of the safety system must be avoided if a security update
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is applied. As a solution to this update problem, they describe a network in-
trusion detection system (NIDS) architecture that physically separates safety
and NIDS (security). The NIDS does not require safety certification because
it operates on a communication channel comprising safety communication with
built-in interference detection. We propose an anomaly detection that works
on the safety communication as well, but on the same hardware platform as
the safety application, as proposed by Heinrich et al. [6]. The hardware plat-
form avoids the physical gap between safety system and security system which
again could be the surface to mount an attack. Heinrich et al. have shown that
virtual separation is sufficient to operate safety-critical and non-safety-critical
applications.
Fovino et al. [8] show that current firewall generations cannot detect attacks
that are based on licit commands. In particular, the firewalls fail to determine
whether a licit command arrives mistimed and transforms the system in a crit-
ical state. Moreover, a series of licit commands could be chained together to
move the system to a critical state. The authors propose to enrich the firewall
with information about the architecture and the state of the protected system.
We use equivalent information for railway signalling, but use it to enrich the
actuators themselves and not a distinguished firewall.
Similar to Fovino et al., Caselli et al. [9] describe an intrusion detection system
(IDS) that defends against sequence attacks. They utilize a Markov chain model
of the controlled CPS as countermeasure. Their controlled system is a water
treatment and purification facility that uses Modbus communication. Sequence
attacks are a specific type of semantic attack that concern the misplacement of
system operation events that are licit if considered individually.
Jin et al. [10] employ the semantics of the controlled process to infer anomaly
detection rules similar to the idea behind our work. Their work is based on
electricity networks, where they developed invariants to verify across defined lo-
cations of the network. The Linear Invariant Checker and Bus-zero-sum Checker
are derived from physical laws that are always valid in an electrical grid.
Temple et al. [4] study the impact of an attacker on train service. The attacker
targets availability and integrity of balises that are used to determine the exact
position of a train for precise stopping. They consider train operation as a CPS
because a train is governed by physical laws while influenced by control actions.
Their countermeasure includes a train braking model of the physical world to
mitigate the influence of missing or forged balise location information.
3. Model
We first outline a typical signalling network infrastructure that we consider in
this article. Then, we explain the capabilities of an attacker in this infrastructure
by devising an appropriate attacker model.
3.1. Infrastructure Model
In railway signalling, a signal box communicates with field elements (FEs) via
an Ethernet/IP network within the area of a railway station. In our railway
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infrastructure model, we consider three types of FEs: light signals, points and
train detection systems (TDSs). The latter monitor the vacancy of track sec-
tions. To ensure safe train movement through the infrastructure, the signal box
receives reports on the vacancy of track sections from the TDSs and sends ac-
cording commands to the points and light signals. In turn, the points and light
signals report the execution of a command with their updated state back to the
signal box. We call this type of communication the safety channel because
it happens for the safety of train operation. The signal box keeps track of the
states of all FEs in its supervised area. It updates the states accordingly after
commanding a state change and receiving the respective confirmation. A human
traffic controller supervises train operation by requesting the signal box to set
the infrastructure to allow the desired train movement. The signal box validates
any requested state change against its internal states. If the state change would
create an unsafe state (potential derailment or collision), the request is rejected.
In the following section, we discuss why this validation for safety reasons does
not suffice from a security perspective.
An example topology of a railway signalling network including all types of con-
sidered FEs is shown in Fig. 1. We use it to showcase our anomaly detection in
this article. Thin dashed lines indicate the safety channels between signal box
and FEs. In general, one signal box operates all the FEs in the area of a single
railway station.
A
W1
W22
W21
P2 N2
N1
F
Signal Box
TDS TDS
TDS
TDS TDS
TDS
TDS
1001
2
1 2001
Figure 1: Example topology of a railway signalling network. Black lines depict the railway
track. Thin dashed lines depict safety channels. A, Px, Nx, F depict signals. Wx depict
points. TDS indicates train detection systems.
3.2. Attacker Model
Current signalling networks transmit commands and reports between the signal
box and FEs via closed but otherwise unprotected networks. On top of the
Ethernet, IP and UDP stack, a transport protocol called Rail Safe Transport
Application (RaSTA) is standardised in Germany, that provides only limited
security properties to protect against cyberattacks [11]. Authentication and in-
tegrity have already been identified as security requirements of railway signalling
and several solutions have been proposed to mitigate security risks [1, 2, 6].
However, for several reasons it is important to deploy further security measures
in signalling networks. First, following a defence in depth concept [12], it is
good practice to design systems with multiple layers of security, in case parts of
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the defence concept (e.g., message authentication) are broken or circumvented
by an attacker. Second, due to the certification processes required by safety
authorities, it might be impossible to introduce security measures in the safety
channel, leaving the communication unprotected. Railway safety is a strictly
regulated domain where any change of the system undergoes a certification
process whose duration is incompatible with the frequent changes IT security
requires to maintain adequate protection. Current practice is to put a protective
security shell [1] around the safety system (the signal box and FE control),
leaving the safety unchanged during a security patch to avoid the need for re-
certification. In contrast, if the attacker successfully penetrates the security
shell, the safety system is fully exposed and unprotected. This underlines the
need for a defence in depth concept which the presented anomaly detection is a
part of. From a safety perspective, we consider derailments and collisions as the
attacker-provoked hazards that must be mitigated by the security shell. This
view is supported in other literature, such as Bloomfield et al. [13]. In general,
the approach of the attacker is to gain control over a FE or to desynchronise the
internal state of the signal box from reality such that a hazardous command is
issued by the signal box due to wrong information about a FE’s state.
In this article, we consider a Dolev-Yao attacker [14] who gained access to the
signalling network but cannot break cryptographic primitives such as encryp-
tion. For the safety channel, this implies that the attacker can monitor any
message and therefore infer the state of every FE and the location of every
train in the supervised area. As messages, we consider control commands and
reports that adhere to the application and transmission layer protocols used in
railway signalling. These message are: command and report to set a signal as-
pect, command and report to switch a point, and the report of a TDS whether
a track section is occupied. Furthermore, without a functional security shell,
the attacker can suppress any message between the signal box and a FE as well
as inject arbitrary messages that will be accepted by the receiving entity. We
consider this feasible because tools to spoof and inject messages in standard
protocols such as Ethernet, IP and UDP are easily available, as are the defini-
tions of railway application protocols. Exploiting her capabilities, the attacker
can provoke a derailment by switching a point while a train is running over it.
Furthermore, she could set a signal to clear with the intention of leading a train
into a section that is already occupied by another vehicle, provoking a collision.
For both conditions to occur, a single command posing as the signal box to a
FE is sufficient. Consequently, a sophisticated attacker can stay unnoticeable
to any detection mechanism until she sends her first harmful message. This
requires a strong defence mechanism that is capable of detecting single harmful
messages in the context of railway signalling.
We do not consider physical attacks on signalling equipment because they are
easily possible due to the spatial extension of the railway network. It is even
simpler to perform physical attacks that do not qualify as cyberattacks. Block-
ing the tracks is executable with less resources and expert knowledge than,
for example, physically compromising the controller of a FE. However, physi-
cal attacks can not be scaled to a multitude of FEs compared to the attacks we
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describe, which can be executed on multiple targets at the same time. Addition-
ally, physical attacks often leave witnesses, and most importantly, an identifiable
offender, whereas cyberattacks may be implemented as a thousand papercuts
without any clear idea of the attacker, or, if implemented particularly well, that
there even is an attacker (e.g., Stuxnet).
We also consider a second attacker type in this work. This attacker compromises
the signal box of the railway station instead of attacking on network level like
the Dolev-Yao attacker. With this power over the signal box, she can configure
a set of FEs to provoke derailments or collisions as well. The signal box is the
single authority to send commands to the FEs via the safety channel. Thus,
message authentication on the safety channel provides no protection in this case.
This attacker type could be internal (malicious employee), a railway targeted
malware (like Stuxnet) that made its way to the signal box, or a remote hacker
who gained access to the signal box.
4. Anomaly Detection
We explain each component of our anomaly detection system in detail and
illustrate the functionality in an example where a route for a train is set. Then,
we discuss how a security alert can be treated in a safety-critical system by
mapping security incidents to safety failure modes.
4.1. Security Channel
We observe that the FEs slavishly obey any command that is sent to their con-
trol loop by the signal box and cannot distinguish hazardous commands. Our
strategy to counter the shortcomings is to enhance the FEs with state informa-
tion of nearby FEs. We extend the star-shaped communication pattern of the
safety channels shown in Fig. 1, that stipulates signal box to FE communica-
tion only. To exchange additional information about the state of neighbouring
FEs, we allow communication between FEs. With this extra information, FEs
can collaboratively validate a received command against the configuration of
the surrounding infrastructure. We design our anomaly detection as a process
that runs in an isolated partition on the same hardware that is controlling the
FEs as proposed by Heinrich et al. [6]. The anomaly detection receives the
messages of the safety channel and influences the control loop running in a sec-
ond partition in case of a detected anomaly. As the exchanged information and
the subsequent analysis by the FE is a security measure, we call the commu-
nication between FEs security channel. Figure 2 shows the control loop of
two FEs interacting with the signal box via a safety channel and their anomaly
detection processes interacting via a security channel. Messages sent over the
security channel need to be authenticated, such that an attacker can not alter
the exchanged information.
We have identified three types of FEs that we consider for anomaly detection in
this paper: signals, points, and TDSs. For TDSs, we distinguish two subtypes
that either monitor a track section (TrackSectionTDS) or a point (PointTDS).
Figure 3 gives an overview of the three types.
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Figure 2: Overview of Signal Box, FE control loop and anomaly detection.
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Figure 3: Visualization of field elements.
We explain the communication links (security channel) that are established by
our anomaly detection. Our analysis yields that a security channel needs to
be established between immediate neighbours in the track topology and only
between them. A signal is linked to the TDS monitoring the adjacent track
section (“succ” in Fig. 3a). A track section (Fig. 3b) connects tracks in two
directions which we call A and B. In both directions, it can be bounded by
an incoming signal (“pred A” in Fig. 3b), an outgoing signal (“succ B”) or no
particular FE (“pred B”, “succ A”). The section boundaries are marked with a
orthogonal line to the track in Fig. 3. Each section is monitored by a TDS for
vacancy. If a signal is present at the border of a track section, the TDS is linked
to the signal. Otherwise it is linked to the neighbouring TDS. If no neighbour
exists (e.g., a dead-end track), no channel in that direction is established to
implicitly model the end of the supervised area. A TDS monitoring a point
(Fig. 3c) adds a third direction, called C, corresponding to the concept we
explained for track sections. A train can only run safely over a point in relation
A-C if the point is set to left, and in relation A-B if the point is set to right. Train
movement in relation B-C is impossible. The TDS monitoring the point and the
point itself require a security channel between each other as well. All security
channels of our example topology (see Fig. 1) are visualized as arrows in Fig. 4.
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Arrows show the successor relation in the direction they point. Following an
arrow backwards, represents the predecessor relation. For example, Track 1001
is the successor of Signal A, while Signal A is also the predecessor of Track 1001.
Arrows pointing to and from symbol Ø are an empty reference because the
supervised area is left or the track is a dead-end. Arrows point in both directions
if the relations are also valid reversed.
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Figure 4: Topology with arrows visualizing Security Channels.
4.2. Detection Triggers
Our rule-based anomaly detection utilizes two triggers to start its detection
algorithm. We have selected the triggers by analysing which commands can be
exploited by the attacker to run an attack forcing the railway system into an
unsafe state and thus are critical:
Point Trigger: Every time a point receives the command to change position,
the point runs the anomaly detection algorithm explained in Section 4.3.1.
Signal Trigger: Every time a signal receives a command to set to an aspect
that permits train movement (set up a route), the signal starts the anomaly
detection algorithm for a route explained in Section 4.3.2.
We distinguish only two signal aspects in our anomaly detection: stop and clear.
There is a variety of signal aspects that allow a train to pass a signal. Examples
include the usual clear aspect, approach, substitution signal, drive on sight, and
more. We map all aspects that allow a train to pass the signal to the clear
aspect to reduce the complexity of our anomaly detection rules. In all cases
where a train passes a signal, our anomaly detection rules are invoked.
4.3. Detection Algorithms
We distinguish two detection algorithms triggered by the point and the signal
trigger presented in Section 4.2, respectively. An instance of the algorithm is
executed on the controller of each FE between entry and exit signal of a route.
Each FE communicates with the respective instance on a neighbouring FE via
the security channel. FE state, locks and anomaly detection information are
stored on each FE’s controller as well.
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4.3.1. Algorithm for a Point
The general idea behind our anomaly detection algorithm is the following: on
every command to change position, the point communicates with its associated
TDS and requests the track’s vacancy state. Only if the TDS is not occupied
by a train and not reserved for a route (locked), the TDS will acknowledge the
request. After receiving the TDS’s acknowledgement, the point will execute the
command and switch position.
4.3.2. Algorithm for a Route
Every time a signal receives a command to set an aspect that allows train
movement (e.g., clear), a recursive query to the FEs along the pre-set route is
started by the signal via the security channel. The signal queries its successor
TDS with a request whether it is safe to allow train movement. If the track
section is neither occupied nor reserved for another train (locked), the query is
forwarded to the succeeding TDS, that in turn checks its status and forwards
the query. When the query reaches a signal (end of route) or a TDS with
no successive TDS (dead-end track, yard limits reached), this FE notifies the
signal which started the query of the availability of the route. If at one of the
TDSs along the path one or more conditions are violated, the query is returned
immediately, informing the signal that the command should be rejected. A
successful query is illustrated and explained in Section 4.4.
On receiving a query, a TDS sets its internal state to locked to mark that it has
been reserved for a route. Once locked, a TDS will reject further availability
queries, thus preventing multiple routes from overlapping on that track section
and avoiding a collision. The locked state is left when the TDS detects a train
occupying its track section or the signal is set to an aspect prohibiting train
movement (stop) without a train having passed it (e.g., route cancelling by the
traffic controller). In this case, the signal notifies the unnecessarily locked FEs
to release their locks again. The algorithm performed by a TDS is sketched in
Listing 1. Calls to the method isAvailable are used to symbolize a query to
an adjacent FE via the security channel.
A TDS monitoring a point additionally performs the lookup of the correct neigh-
bour according to the state of the point and forwards the query accordingly, if
such a neighbour exists. The algorithm is sketched in Listing 2.
4.3.3. Unlocking a Route after a Reject
If a query is rejected by one of the FEs, the FEs earlier in the query have locked
themselves and need to be unlocked in order to be available for other routes.
Thus, the notification about the rejection travels back through the FEs, such
that each FE leaves the lock state. The unlocking is necessary to keep the
railway station operable. Otherwise, more and more FEs would get locked over
time, thus starving train operation.
4.3.4. Cancelling a Route
The traffic controller can cancel a route before a train has used it, if necessary.
This case needs to be reflected by our anomaly detection because the TDSs
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1 isAvailable(src):
2 if state == TDSState.CLEAR:
3 if locked:
4 return False
5 lock()
6 if src == pred_a:
7 if succ_b is not NULL:
8 return succ_b.isAvailable(this)
9 else:
10 return True
11 if src == pred_b:
12 if succ_a is not NULL:
13 return succ_a.isAvailable(this)
14 else:
15 return True
16 return False
Listing 1: TrackSectionTDS.isAvailable(), compare Fig. 3b.
1 isAvailable(src):
2 if state == TDSState.CLEAR:
3 if locked:
4 return False
5 lock()
6 if src == pred_a:
7 if point.state == PointState.RIGHT:
8 if succ_b is not NULL:
9 return succ_b.isAvailable(this)
10 else:
11 return True
12 else:
13 if succ_c is not NULL:
14 return succ_c.isAvailable(this)
15 else:
16 return True
17 if src == pred_b and point.state == PointState.RIGHT:
18 if succ_a is not NULL:
19 return succ_a.isAvailable(this)
20 else:
21 return True
22 if src == pred_c and point.state == PointState.LEFT:
23 if succ_a is not NULL:
24 return succ_a.isAvailable(this)
25 else:
26 return True
27 return False
Listing 2: PointTDS.isAvailable(), compare Fig. 3c.
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must be unlocked again. Otherwise, the anomaly detection would raise false
positives due to locked track sections that should actually be available. This
could eventually starve train operation because the infrastructure becomes un-
available for train movement. For cancelling a route, the entrance signal of the
route needs to be set to stop. Then, the signal will send a message to the FEs of
the route, notifying them to unlock. This message must only be sent if no train
has passed the signal yet, which the signal can determine by communicating
with the adjacent TDS. If the TDS has not been occupied while the signal was
set to clear, a train cannot have passed the signal. Thus, it is necessary to send
the unlock notification.
4.4. Illustration of Detection Rules
A sequence diagram showing the safety channel and security channel communi-
cation between signal box and the FEs to set a route is depicted in Fig. 5. We use
the infrastructure depicted in Figs. 1 and 4. The diagram assumes an approach-
ing train from the left that starts at Signal A, should turn left at Point W1,
run along Track 2 and finally stop in front of Signal N2. First, the signal box
commands Point W1 to switch to left (safety channel). Point W1 executes the
detection algorithm (security channel, canSwitch) and subsequently acknowl-
edges the new state to the signal box. Then, the signal box commands Signal A
to show clear (safety channel). Subsequently, Signal A starts the anomaly de-
tection query (security channel, isAvailable) that follows the intended route
until it is acknowledged by Signal N2. During the query, the TDS of Point W1
requests the state of the point before forwarding the query. The diagram shows
that the query follows the path the train will eventually take: start at Signal A,
pass Track 1001, Point W1, Track 2, and stop before Signal N2.
4.5. Handling of Alerts
Railway transportation is a critical infrastructure that is strictly regulated by
safety authorities. The criticality of the infrastructure demands careful design
of any security measure to avoid interference with the safety functionality and
maintain operation [5, 7]. Once the anomaly detection raises an alert, a strategy
with minimal interference is required to handle it without degrading safety. We
propose that a FE ignores a safety channel control command and keeps its state
unchanged if an alert by the anomaly detection is triggered. This maintains the
fail-safe property of railway signalling because either a point is not switched or
a signal remains showing a stop aspect. This is viable because the safety system
must be able to deal with FEs not reacting, as this is a failure mode considered in
the safety case already. The safety system cannot distinguish whether a message
is deliberately ignored or dropped by an anomaly detection system or simply lost
due to a network failure. Additionally, our anomaly detection system is specially
crafted so that it only interferes (drop or prolong execution) in commands that
are not safety-critical. However, in any case the alert can be collected and be
presented to a security operator for further manual intervention.
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Signal Box A TDS 1001 TDS W1 W1 TDS 2 N2
LEFT
canSwitch
True
ACK
CLEAR
isAvailable
isAvailable
getState
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isAvailable
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Figure 5: Example execution of rule-based anomaly detection. Commands LEFT and CLEAR
of the signal box both trigger the anomaly detection in Point W1 and Signal A respectively.
5. Evaluation
We present the dataset used for evaluation, explain our evaluation concept and
discuss the results.
5.1. Dataset
To evaluate our rule-based anomaly detection, we use a dataset gathered over a
period of three years in the signalling lab of TU Darmstadt1. The signalling lab
simulates real-world railway operation with tracks, signals, points, and trains
in scale 1:87 and is used to qualify traffic controllers of a German railway op-
erator. Also, signal boxes, FEs, and their operation are accurately simulated,
including the network traffic described as safety channel in Section 3.1. Hence,
our dataset contains realistic datagrams with communication of commands and
reports between the signal boxes and the FEs. We select three railway stations
from the dataset and run the recorded datagrams on an implementation of our
1http://www.eisenbahnbetriebsfeld.de/
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rule-based anomaly detection. Each station contains one signal box and is inde-
pendent from the other stations in railway operation and the execution of our
anomaly detection. The stations differ in topology (layout of FEs), size (num-
ber of FEs), and complexity (types of FEs being neighbours). Details about the
datasets are provided in Table 1.
5.2. Attack Scenarios
To validate the functionality of our anomaly detection, we define attack scenarios
against the safety channel as test cases. With the evaluation, we verify the
detection capabilities of our anomaly detection model defined in Section 4, i.e.,
that the attacks are classified as anomalies. We also verify that our model of
normality is valid and does not produce false positives from safe train operation
where no attacker is present.
We define attack modes (derived from the attacker’s capabilities), building
blocks that the attacker uses to desynchronise the signal box’s representation of
the FE states from reality. To ensure a high level of test coverage, we iterate
over the FE types and investigate which dropped message and injected message
would lead the signalling system into a critical, unsafe state. The attack modes
show how the attacker can provoke hazardous situations. They are then used
individually or in combination to conceive the attack scenarios that explain what
the attacker tries to achieve. Figure 6 shows an overview of all attack modes
that create a critical state representation in the signal box.
To reference the attack modes, we name them by the targeted FE and the
action the attacker performs (inject or drop) separated by a dot. For TDS.Drop
(Fig. 6a), the “occupied” report is intended to be sent from the TDS to the
signal box but is intercepted and discarded by the attacker. For TDS.Inject
(Fig. 6b), the attacker impersonates a TDS to counterfeit a cleared track section.
The actual TDS does not send a message at all. Both cases make the signal
box believe a track section is vacant, while it is in fact occupied. In turn, to
manipulate a command to a point, the attacker needs to forge the respective
acknowledgement to not raise suspicion. Thus, she intercepts and discards the
“switch” command in Point.Drop (Fig. 6c) and injects the respective report in
the name of the addressed FE. Analogous semantics apply for the visualizations
of the remaining attack modes.
From this systematic enumeration of attack modes, we derive the following
attack scenarios that we use as test cases for our anomaly detection:
1. Switch point under a train (Point.Inject).
2. Desynchronise point state in the signal box such that a train is diverted
into an unsafe route (Point.Drop, Point.Inject).
3. Allow a train to proceed into a possibly unsafe route:
(a) Deviate the track vacancy state in the signal box such that a train is
allowed to enter an unsafe route if a signal is set to clear (TDS.Drop,
TDS.Inject).
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Signal Box Attacker TDS
OCCUPIED
(a) TDS.Drop: Drop occupy report.
Signal Box Attacker TDS
TDS:CLEAR
(b) TDS.Inject: Inject clear report.
Signal Box Attacker Point
SWITCH
Point:ACK
(c) Point.Drop: Drop switch state command.
Signal Box Attacker Point
SB:SWITCH
ACK
(d) Point.Inject: Inject switch state command.
Signal Box Attacker Signal
STOP
Signal:ACK
(e) Signal.Drop: Drop stop command.
Signal Box Attacker Signal
SB:CLEAR
ACK
(f) Signal.Inject: Inject clear command.
Figure 6: Visualization of attack modes.
(b) Set a signal protecting an unsafe route to clear or prevent it from
setting to stop (Signal.Drop, Signal.Inject).
In braces, we reference the attack modes used to deploy the scenario. A route
is unsafe if at least a part of it is occupied by another vehicle or reserved for
a different, thus conflicting, route. The attacker can use the defined attack
scenarios to achieve her goal of causing a train derailment or collision.
5.3. Results
We tested our anomaly detection system on traffic contained in the three datasets
containing approximately 160 000, 313 000, and 560 000 commands respectively.
To verify the soundness, we ran the system on the datasets without introduced
anomalies, where it exhibited no false positives for all three datasets. Subse-
quently, we introduced anomalies in the datasets according to the described
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attack scenarios. Running the anomaly detection on the modified datasets, we
could observe that all anomalies were found, resulting in no false negatives for
all three datasets. By means of simulation, we are able to show that our rule-
based anomaly detection provides protection against our attacker model without
producing false positives.
The communication overhead of our anomaly detection needs to be put in rela-
tion to the timings of the safety process it protects. We show that our solution
does only add small communication overhead to railway signalling. Setting a
real-world point or signal can typically take up to a few seconds. In fact, setting
a route in early generation mechanical signal boxes is estimated to take around
30 s to 120 s, while modern electronic interlocking systems still require about
6 s to 18 s [15]. Hence, the latency introduced by the anomaly detection while
setting up a route due to waiting for the query to finish is in the margins of
the safety systems. Additionally, controlling the FE is not a time-critical task
because the signal box waits for the response of the FEs in any case, which can
take up to a few seconds for a point.
Station 1 Station 2 Station 3
Field Elements 16 29 60
Commands 161 444 313 177 559 728
Algorithm Executions 28 807 51 205 77 734
Fraction 17.84% 16.35% 13.89%
Total Messages 130 812 154 194 465 200
Maximum Messages∗ 10 14 18
Mean Messages∗ 4.54 3.01 5.98
Median Messages∗ 2.0 2.0 2.0
Table 1: Communication overhead of the security channel. (∗ Number of messages per query.)
Table 1 shows detailed figures of our test implementation runs for each tested
station. The first row shows the number of FEs for each station. Row “Com-
mands” contains the number of safety channel commands in our dataset. “Algo-
rithm Executions” depicts the number of times our anomaly detection algorithm
was started by one of the triggers (see Section 4.2), while “Fraction” is the quo-
tient of the two previous rows to show for how many commands the anomaly de-
tection is executed. Please note that the share of safety channel messages which
trigger the anomaly detection does not exceed 20%. These are commands that
switch a point or set a signal to clear, which could set the infrastructure to a crit-
ical state. The remaining messages report TDS state changes or set a signal to
stop, which is not critical according to our model. Row “Total Messages” shows
the number of security channel messages exchanged. The remaining three rows
indicate the maximum, mean, and median number of security channel messages
exchanged per query. The maximum number of security channel messages is
directly determined by the longest route available in the station. In turn, the
longest route is expected to grow disproportionally to the total number of FEs
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in the station. This determines the worst case latency for the security channel.
However, the mean number of security channel messages is much lower than the
worst case and grows even slower compared to the number of FEs.
6. Discussion
Due to the high level of realism of our dataset collected in the signalling lab of
TU Darmstadt, our rule-based anomaly detection and its effectiveness can be
directly applied to real-world interlocking networks.
6.1. Freedom of Interference
We discussed that the fail-safe property of railway signalling is maintained by
our anomaly detection because the failure mode is already covered by the safety
case (see Section 4.5). Anomaly detection as well as other security measures can
be implemented on a FE’s controller while maintaining freedom of interference
by utilizing a hardware platform as proposed in [6]. The hardware platform
provides sufficient resources (CPU, memory) to execute our anomaly detection.
A certified hypervisor ensures that the resources of the safety application con-
trolling the FE can not be exhausted by other applications, ensuring freedom
of interference.
6.2. Scalability
Our anomaly detection can be scaled to railway stations of arbitrary size (num-
ber of FEs) because the length of a route typically does not grow in the same
order of magnitude as the station’s size. This can be seen in Table 1 by com-
paring the number of FEs (station size) to the maximum and mean number of
messages per query (route length). Additionally, the queries of multiple routes
are executed in parallel and do not consume significant network bandwidth
because they require only a few bytes (state information plus, e.g., message
authentication code (MAC) for authenticity).
6.3. Limitations
There are several special cases of train operation that are not yet covered by the
ruleset presented in this article. After the exit signal of a route, the consecutive
section, the so-called overlap, needs to be vacant as well. The overlap is reserved
in case the train is unable to stop at the signal and slips past it. This is not
reflected with our anomaly detection. Furthermore, approach signals forecast
the aspect of a main signal to accommodate for the long breaking distances of
trains. A check needs to be performed that the approach signal always shows
the signal aspect respective to the aspect of the following main signal. This
case needs to consider that an approach signal can be assigned to multiple
main signals and vice versa. We do not consider overlap, approach signals, and
shunting signals in this paper for simplicity, but plan to handle them and more
special cases in future work.
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6.4. Merits
Our anomaly detection makes railway signalling resilient to the two attacker
types described in Section 3.2: a Dolev-Yao attacker in the communication
network issuing licit but mistimed command an control messages as well as
an attacker who compromises the signal box which holds and evaluates the
safety logic. In particular, the Dolev-Yao attacker can control all safety channels
without being able to implement a successful attack by dropping or injecting
control messages. Any attempt to set the infrastructure to an unsafe state
is prohibited by the rules of the anomaly detection (security channel) as we
evaluated with our attack scenarios in Section 5.
Additionally, the attacker can gain control over the signal box, which gives her
full control over the supervised area and the power to cause severe damage.
With the proposed anomaly detection system in place, the actions of the signal
box are validated against the ruleset independently and hazardous commands
rejected on each FE, thus fully mitigating the possibilities of a rogue signal box
to create critical states.
Changes to the safety functionality of the railway system are required to undergo
a lengthy admission process that conflicts with typical security update cycles.
This “update problem”, as identified in several other publications [1, 2, 5], is
avoided by our anomaly detection. Our rules are derived once and are static
such that updates are not required. The anomaly detection is general enough to
be applied to arbitrary railway stations independent from their concrete topol-
ogy, which we showed by applying it to three different topologies in our evalu-
ation. Hence, our rule-based anomaly detection can be re-used by configuring
the security channels once for any new station.
7. Conclusion
We described a distributed rule-based anomaly detection system dedicated to
the critical infrastructure of railway transportation. As one of several secu-
rity measures in a defence in depth concept for a safety-critical system, the
anomaly detection mitigates the threats of two attacker types: an attacker who
compromised a railway station’s signal box that contains the safety logic and
a Dolev-Yao attacker who gained access to the signalling network. Both at-
tacker types aim to cause a train collision or derailment. Our work shows that
anomaly detection is an effective defence strategy which can be applied to rail-
way stations of arbitrary topology and size. It inspects control commands at
the receiving FE and verifies their harmlessness by applying knowledge about
the current state of neighbouring FEs along the route the train is supposed to
travel. If a hazardous command is detected, the anomaly detection system pre-
vents the execution of the command with minimal interference with the safety
functionality and raises an alert about the incident. Small overhead is produced
by allowing FEs to communicate with each other that are immediate neighbours
in the railway topology.
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